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Brown v. Board of Education1 is a watershed in American law and society. It affects our
understanding of race, of constitutionalism, and of equality. It also affects our understanding of
what happened before Brown. Our knowledge of how things turned out tinges our view of the
struggles for civil rights before 1954, and we are understandably wont to focus on the events and
people that shaped Brown as we consider civil-rights lawyering in the decades between World
War I and World War II.
In an important contribution to the history of the civil-rights movement, Kenneth Mack
argues that the standard account of African-American civil-rights lawyering in the decades
before Brown is wrong.2 So are the standard revisionist accounts. According to Mack’s
historiography, the dominant “legal liberal” account of Brown tells a story of a band of civilrights lawyers who spent a generation crafting a litigation strategy and orchestrating a series of
cases ultimately intended to overthrow de jure segregation in public institutions.3 AfricanAmerican civil-rights lawyers followed Charles Hamilton Houston’s plan to use the courts to
“socially engineer” an equal society. Further, their idealistic commitment to institutional change
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through formal, judicially recognized legal rights separated them from the legal realism
academically fashionable in the decades after World War I.4 The revisionist critiques of the
“legal liberal” thesis accept the claimed ideological commitments of African-American civilrights lawyers to the strategy of using courts to alter discriminatory public institutions. They
contend, however, that the limitations of courts as effective agents for achieving racial equality
either doomed the “legal liberal” project to failure in the long run, or wasted time and energy
better spent agitating for true changes in the status quo.5
Mack intervenes with a new thesis: In the years between the First and Second World
Wars, African-American civil-rights lawyers were not primarily engaged in, nor committed to, a
court-based strategy to end segregation in public institutions. Their ideas for achieving civil
rights and racial equality focused on methods other than the litigation campaign which yielded
Brown, and on goals other than eliminating public segregation. Instead, “race uplift” was the
dominant goal. Race uplift had two components. The first was “voluntarism,” which Mack
describes as an attempt to provide a legal foundation beneath black institutions that were
established to replicate white institutions in the African-American communities of the North.6
The second was “legalism,” which involved making “moral and legal claims directed to the
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larger white majority.”7 Although African-American lawyers remained “cognizant of the
discrimination and segregation that hemmed them in,”8 voluntarism was the dominant strategy.
The principal role of black lawyers was to assist black professionals and black entrepreneurs
establish enterprises that would employ black workers and service black communities; in turn,
black employees would amass property and be able to climb the employment ladders previously
reserved for whites. In the 1930s, the legal strategy shifted to some degree from voluntarism —
but not yet toward litigation. New influences — especially rising exasperation with
discrimination in private employment, Marxism, and a belief in collective, race-based actions
such as boycotts9 — caused a shift in the understanding of what black lawyers might do to
enable racial progress. Unlike the post-World War II Brown strategy, however, the Depressionera litigation strategy focused primarily on private rather than public institutions. Mack also
goes to some lengths to prove argue that the intellectual commitments of the interwar civil-rights
lawyers was — contrary to the standard “legal liberal” and revisionist views — decidedly realist
in its mien.10
Mack’s claim is a universal one about civil-rights lawyering. But his proof is particular.
He focuses on the ideas and strategies of a small band of lawyers who plied their trade along the
eastern seaboard, from Cambridge to New York, and from Philadelphia to Baltimore to
Washington, D.C. The principal lawyers in his narrative are Charles Hamilton Houston and the
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cadre of disciples who followed him to Harvard Law School for their initial or advanced law
degrees, including William Henry Hastie and Leon Ransom.11 The husband-and-wife team of
Randolph Pace Alexander and Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander also features prominently.12
Two of Houston’s foremost disciples, Thurgood Marshall and James Nabrit, Jr., receive scant
treatment (perhaps because they never studied at Harvard, and thus could not be shown to have
fallen under the realist influences of Pound and Frankfurter13). Mack’s focus is understandable;
Hamilton and his band of lawyers ultimately engineered the victory in Brown, so studying their
strategies in the interwar years helps to debunk the “legal liberal” storyline of an inexorable
march to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson.14 But the claim that African-American civil-rights
lawyers generally ascribed to the interwar strategies that Mack attributes to Houston’s circle
rests on an inference.
Oblivious to the terms of this debate, Earl B. Dickerson: A Voice for Freedom and
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Equality15 marches straight into the controversy. Dickerson is a flattering biography of Earl
Burrus Dickerson, Chicago’s leading African-American lawyer between the World Wars. To
some extent, Dickerson’s failure to locate Earl Dickerson within the larger story of AfricanAmerican civil-rights lawyering is excusable. Drafted by Robert Blakely, a Chicago journalist
and writer, Dickerson began as an oral history project intended to memorialize the lives of noted
Chicago residents. Although fleshed out with the reminiscences of Dickerson’s admirers, its
principal source is hours of taped conversations between Blakely and Dickerson conducted in
1983, just three years before Dickerson’s death at the age of ninety-five. Blakely himself died in
1994, and his manuscript languished for years. Len Rubinowitz of Northwestern Law School
discovered the manuscript and kept it alive; freelance writer Marcus Shepard did the final
polishing.
The book brims with the ex post inevitability and justness of the civil-rights cause,16 and
at times relies too uncritically on the sometimes faulty memory of an aged and atypical warrior.17
Nonetheless, Dickerson is a critical book for understanding the role of African-American civilrights lawyers in the two decades between the World Wars. Dickerson’s career provides
considerable support for Mack’s thesis, but also poses some significant challenges that might
require refinements. The inability to cabin Dickerson neatly into Mack’s intellectual categories
is in large part due to the messiness of human life — especially a life lived as greatly as
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Dickerson lived his. But the “legal liberal” account, its revisions, and Mack’s thesis suffer from
a common flaw. They assume that African-American civil-rights lawyers had as their principal
focus the cause of African-American equality. For Dickerson, civil-rights lawyering was more
personal than that: It was a piece of the struggle for his own dignity and that of other AfricanAmericans living under deplorable conditions in America’s cities. He used all the means
available to him — legal, economic, and political — to break the color line in as many places as
he could. In many instances he led the way, becoming the first to step across the line.
Dickerson chronicles this extraordinary life. It focuses especially on his successes and failures
during the years between 1937 and 1943 — for good reason. On the verge of America’s entry
into World War II, Dickerson had arguably become the nation’s most prominent and powerful
African-American lawyer. Any discussion of civil-rights lawyering in the years between the
World Wars must, therefore, account for Earl Dickerson.18

I

In the years between 1920 and 1943, Dickerson rose to become the “dean of Chicago’s
black lawyers.”19 This was no mean feat. Swollen by the ranks of the Great Migration, Chicago
during these years contained the second largest African-American population in the country, and

18

Mack briefly refers to Dickerson at three points in his article, see Mack, supra note 2, at
282, 288, 345, but does not fully explore the effects of Dickerson’s career on his thesis.
19

See Jay Tidmarsh, The Story of Hansberry: The Foundation for Modern Class Actions, in
CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 217, 242 (Kevin M. Clermont ed. 2004).
-6-

the largest number of African-American lawyers.20 The bar contained such notables such as C.
Francis Stradford, for whom the National Bar Association’s highest award is named,21 and Irwin
Mollison, who became the first African-American appointed to a life-tenured federal judgeship
in 1945.22 Yet Dickerson stood clearly at their head — a fact proven by Dickerson’s role in his
most famous civil-rights case, Hansberry v. Lee,23 in which Stradford, Mollison, and two other
civil-rights lawyers played supporting roles to Dickerson’s lead.24 In 1941, Dickerson was a
Chicago alderman, a member of the NAACP’s Board of Directors, and a member of Franklin
Roosevelt’s Federal Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), which was the federal
government’s most significant effort to deal with racial discrimination in employment before
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25 By 1942 Dickerson had become its acting chairman.
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I have read the entire trial transcript in Hansberry, as well as the pleadings, briefs, and
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Little in Dickerson’s background suggested that he was destined for such greatness.
“Earl. B,” as his friends called him (or “Silk Stocking Earl,” as his detractors called him),26 was
born in 1891 in Canton, Mississippi. He was tall, handsome, inquisitive, of mixed race —
although the racial mores of the time put him on the Negro side of the color line.27 As a boy he
saw his brother-in-law shot and permanently disabled for no greater a matter than jostling a
white man who was carrying packages.28 His family valued education, and his mother slipped
Pullman porters a few dollars so that he could jump trains to New Orleans and then Chicago in
order to obtain a high school education.29 He was one of the million African-Americans who
flowed North in the early decades of the twentieth century, one of 200,000 who found their way
to Chicago.30 He left “feudal Mississippi,” he recalled late in his life, “clothed with little else
than a burning sense of outrage and a driving resolve, cradled in the Declaration of
Independence, not to be bullied, browbeaten, or held hostage, in fact or in spirit — ever again.”31
Whether or not an accurate description of his mindset as he jumped the train to Chicago, the
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statement is emblematic of the Dickerson portrayed in the biography — driven, fearless, and
intolerant of racial injustice.
Dickerson matriculated from Northwestern, and graduated from the University of
Illinois. After spending a year teaching at Tuskegee Institute with Booker T. Washington and
another year as a principal in a black school in Indiana, he enrolled at the University of Chicago
Law School in 1915.32 After his second year, he joined the Army and served in France as an
officer of a black regiment in World War I — nearly refusing his commission when he realized
that black and white units would be segregated.33 While stationed in France after the war,
Dickerson ran into a white officer who invited him to a meeting to discuss the establishment of a
veterans’ organization — thus making Dickerson the only African-American founder of the
American Legion.34 He returned to Chicago and earned his law degree in 1920 — thus making
Dickerson the first African-American graduate of the University of Chicago Law School.35
The Chicago to which Dickerson returned after the war teemed with racial tension.
Between July, 1917 and July, 1919, twenty four bombs were thrown at the homes of African
Americans and those who sold or leased to them. Other acts of violence, a recurring lack of
police protection, horrid housing conditions, and exclusion from decent schools and jobs finally
boiled over into the Chicago Riots of 1919, whose precipitating cause was the stoning death of
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an African-American boy who had inadvertently floated across the imaginary color line at a
Lake Michigan beach. The Chicago Riots left thirty-eight people dead, 537 injured, and 1,000
homeless and destitute.36 In the ensuing two decades, Chicagoans did little to ameliorate racial
divisions and much to enhance them. Realtors introduced racial covenants in the 1920s in most
of the neighborhoods surrounding Chicago’s Black Belt, thus constricting a swelling AfricanAmerican population to a limited number of housing units.37 In the 1930s, Chicago engaged in
an ill-fated (and arguably racially motivated) urban-renewal project that leveled as much as ten
percent of the housing stock available to African Americans.38
Unable to find work at several of Chicago’s leading law firms despite sterling
recommendations from James Parker Hall and Ernest Freund of the University of Chicago,39
Dickerson too felt the effects of discrimination. Without other options, he accepted a job as
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After the Supreme Court held racial zoning ordinances unconstitutional, see Buchanan v.
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19, at 220-21; Wendy Plotkin, Deeds of Mistrust: Race, Housing, and Restrictive Covenants in
Chicago, 1900-53 13-32 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Illinois at
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Loop available to African Americans. See Allen R. Kamp, The History Behind Hansberry v.
Lee, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 481, 484 (1987); Richard R.W. Brooks, Covenants & Conventions
1-2, 20 & n.70 (Sep. 2002), at www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/csls/covenant.pdf. See also
Plotkin, supra, at 21-32 (discussing various studies on extent of covenants).
38
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general counsel at Liberty Life Insurance Company, a fledgling black-owned corporation at
which Dickerson had done some clerking before he graduated.40 Liberty Life sold life insurance,
mortgages, and other financial products to African-Americans, who had previously needed to
rely on the vagaries of the few white financial institutions who would serve them.41 In one
capacity or another, Dickerson worked at Liberty Life — which changed its name to Supreme
Liberty Life Insurance Company when it merged with two other African-American lifeinsurance companies in 1929 — until 1971.42 After the merger, Supreme Liberty grew into one
of the largest African-American businesses in the country, and remained in the top ten such
businesses into the 1990s.43 Supreme Liberty’s growth, and its very survival during bleak years
in the 1930s and 1950s, owed a great deal to Dickerson’s legal and business acumen.44
Somehow Dickerson also managed to maintain a private law practice, and, on top of that, he
worked at times in the 1920s and 1930s as an assistant corporation counsel for the City of
Chicago or an assistant attorney general for the State of Illinois.45
Dickerson’s legal star blazed as he emerged victorious from Hansberry in 1940. In 1937,
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Id. at 43.
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Id. at 168; DRAKE & CAYTON, supra note 20, at 463.
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Dickerson, supra note 15, at 42-43, 166-88. See DRAKE & CAYTON, supra note 20, at
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in the country).
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he had helped to found the National Lawyers Guild, the nation’s first integrated bar association.46
In 1939 he helped found the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, and became president
of the Chicago chapter of the Urban League.47 That same year he won election to the Chicago
City Council, one of two African-Americans to serve as aldermen.48 Dickerson ran as a
Democrat; he had been one of the first African Americans to abandon the party of Lincoln when
he stumped across the northern states in 1924 to swing black voters to the Democratic ticket.49
Just four months after his victory in Hansberry, Dickerson was a platform guest at Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s’s third inauguration.50 Later in 1941, Walter White, the NAACP’s executive
secretary, helped to secure Dickerson’s election to the NAACP’s Board of Directors.451 Also in
1941 and also on White’s recommendation, Roosevelt appointed Dickerson to the FEPC as one
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Id. at 142-49.
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Id. at 152-57; Earl B. Dickerson, http://blsa.uchicago.edu/edickerson.html (visited Oct. 2,
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biographies of Dickerson.
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Id. at 61-65.
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Id. at 84.
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Unfortunately, Dickerson does not explore how Dickerson and White came to know each
other. It might have been while Dickerson served on the executive committee of the Chicago
chapter of the NAACP in the 1930s. Undoubtedly White was impressed by Dickerson’s victory
in Hansberry, which effectively led to the invalidation of a racially restrictive covenant on
Chicago’s South Side. Such victories were few and far between, and the campaign against these
covenants was an issue dear to White, who had shrewdly used a campaign against racially
restrictive covenants to buoy a failing NAACP in the 1920s. See BOYLE, supra note 30, at 20114, 219-27.
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of its two African-American members.52
By 1943, however, Dickerson had tumbled from power. Although he was charming and
unflinchingly courteous, Dickerson’s other traits — such as blunt intolerance of discrimination,
unyielding sense of justice, and dogged determination — undermined him politically. As an
alderman, he was a constant agitator for the fair treatment of African Americans in education,
housing, and employment. He had some successes. He achieved greater funding for schools to
educate black children, and even blocked an appropriation until the Council agreed to integrate a
trade school. He forced the companies who operated Chicago’s bus system to integrate their
workforce and hire a few black drivers. He tried to improve health care, and to alleviate
overcrowding in the African-American neighborhoods on the South Side.53 But Dickerson
wasn’t interested in power for its own sake, and didn’t like to play political games. He didn’t
have the common touch with his constituents. He frequently angered the mayor with his
outspokenness and his refusal to go along. In the Democratic primary for Congress in 1942, he
chose to run against the machine’s hand-picked candidate and lost a nasty election decisively. In
1943, while he was traveling across the country as a member of FEPC, the local Democratic
machine decided to endorse an apprentice firefighter to run for Dickerson’s aldermanic seat.
Dickerson returned just in time to attend the meeting at which he lost the party’s endorsement.54
Dickerson then left the Democratic Party; and, except for a failed primary bid for the Republican
nomination for Congress in 1944 and a predictably disastrous run for Congress as the leftist
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Dickerson, supra note 15, at 109-16.
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Id. at 73-84.
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Id. at 68, 70, 86-92.
-13-

Progressive Party’s candidate in 1948,55 he was never again a legislative force.
Similar things happened on FEPC. Roosevelt had constituted the committee because
discriminatory practices among defense contractors were causing labor unrest and nationwide
protests among African-Americans just as America’s war engine was revving up.56 Whether or
not Roosevelt expected the committee to do anything, Dickerson saw in the committee an
opportunity to work against racial discrimination in employment. Although it had little legal
power to do anything, the committee could hold hearings and issue findings. At its hearings
around the country, FEPC frequently found instances of discrimination, and the testimony it
elicited put governmental and contractor practices in a poor light.57 Dickerson, who was elected
as acting chairman for crucial hearings that the chairman was unable to attend, was a bulldozer.
He examined dissembling contractors forcefully. He knocked heads with government
bureaucrats who saw FEPC as a threat to the war effort and, on one occasion, even crossed
swords with Roosevelt.58 Dickerson’s relentless pursuit of discrimination earned him a quick
trip to the sidelines. When FEPC was reconstituted in 1943, Roosevelt re-appointed every stillserving member of the original FEPC but Dickerson.59 In 1944 Roosevelt appointed another,

55

Id. at 141-43.
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Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-43); Exec. Order No. 8823, 3 C.F.R. 968
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(Carol Publishing Group ed. 1992); MERL E. REED, SEEDTIME FOR THE MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS
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Id. at 129.
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See Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-43); Dickerson, supra note 15, at 132.
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probably safer African-American to FEPC: Charles Hamilton Houston.60
Roosevelt’s decision to sack Dickerson brought an end to Dickerson’s years of
government service. A generation later, in 1961, southern Senators blocked John F. Kennedy’s
plan to nominate Dickerson as an Assistant Secretary of Commerce.61 Later that same year, the
Illinois State Senate refused to approve Dickerson’s nomination to a fair-employment-practices
committee modeled after FEPC.62
The 1940s also marked a turn in Dickerson’s career, as he moved away from the law and
toward business. (One of the limitations of the biography is its failure to explore whether this
shift resulted from Dickerson’s political implosion or marked a change in his thinking about civil
rights, law, and business that was unrelated to his fall from power.) In 1942 he assumed
supervisory control of Supreme Liberty’s mortgage and investments.63 Around the same time he
started a real-estate development company that marketed its homes to African-Americans.64
He kept his hand in the law. In 1945, he was elected president of the National Bar
Association, the African-American bar association that was started in 1925 as a result of the
American Bar Association’s discriminatory practices. Anticipating the litigation strategy that
led to Brown, his acceptance speech called for a challenge to the “separate but equal” doctrine in

60

Mack, supra note 2, at 345. The reconstituted FEPC was reasonably effective, and
enjoyed Roosevelt’s support. Dickerson, supra note 15, at 133.
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education.65 In the same year, he (along with two of his co-counsel in Hansberry) broke the
color barrier in the Chicago Bar Association.66 Dickerson also maintained an appellate and
Supreme Court practice in a few civil-rights cases. On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, he
co-authored an amicus brief in Shelley v. Kramer,67 which achieved what he did not in
Hansberry — the end of the legal enforceability of racially restrictive covenants. He coauthored a successful petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in Dennis v. United
States, which arose from the activities of the communist-hunting House Committee on UnAmerican Activities.68 He was also on the briefs in the lower courts and on the unsuccessful
petitions for writs of certiorari in cases arising from the activities of the National Lawyers Guild
during its defense of members of the Communist Party69 and from a case finding Glen Hearst
Taylor, a United States Senator, guilty of violating a local ordinance when he proposed to use the
65

Id. at 149.
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Id. at 143-47.
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Motion for Leave to File and Brief for the National Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae, Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (Nos. 72, 87, 290, & 291).
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
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on the reply. Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950) (No. 14).
Dickerson also appeared as co-author on an amicus brief in a far more well-known companion
case, in which he unsuccessfully sought rehearing from the Court’s decision. See Petition for
Leave to File and Memorandum of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing, 341 U.S.
491 (1951) (No. 336); Dennis v. United States, 342 U.S. 842 (1951).
69

One of the cases arose out of a contempt citation issued against the lawyers defending
Eugene Dennis for his efforts to build the Communist Party. See United States v. Sacher, 182
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951); Petitioner’s Brief, Sacher v. United
States, 341 U.S. 952 (1951) (No. 201). Another involved a failed effort to obtain an injunction
against a hearing at which the Attorney General proposed to list the National Lawyers Guild as a
Communist organization. See Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 927 (1956),
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“coloreds only” entrance at a Birmingham church in order to address an African-American
gathering.70 The first African-American elected to lead an integrated national bar organization,
Dickerson served as president of the National Lawyers Guild from 1951 to 1954; he guided it
through an especially difficult period in which the Attorney General accused it of being a
subversive organization.71
Just as the litigation campaign to overturn Plessy reached its apotheosis in Brown,
Dickerson left the law behind. In 1955 he stepped into the role as president of Supreme Liberty,
serving until 1971 and again leading the venerable company back from the brink of disaster to
financial stability.72 In 1971, when he retired from Supreme Liberty and also stepped down from
the NAACP’s Board of Directors, he was eighty years old. He had become a businessman, a
banker, and a civic leader — one of the very people that, according to Mack’s thesis, AfricanAmerican civil-rights lawyers like Dickerson had tried to lift up in the years before World War
II. By 1971, however, civil-rights lawyering had taken on a different cast.

II

Because Dickerson began his legal career just after World War I, was winding it down by
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Taylor v. City of Birmingham, 45 So.2d 53 (Ala. App.), cert. denied, 45 So.2d 60 (Ala.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 832 (1950).
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Dickerson, supra note 15, at 149-52. Dickerson was dogged throughout his later life by
accusations that he was a communist. His most effective reply occurred at a hearing on his
admission to the Chicago Bar Association. After indicating that he had amassed some property
and wealth in his life, he remarked, “[I]f any one of you were to undertake to deprive me of my
property, you would find out whether I am a communist.” Id. at 146.
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Id. at 180-88; Earl Dickerson, supra note 43, at 205-11.
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the end of World War II, and had essentially left the profession by the time that Brown was
decided, he seems to present an ideal study of African-American civil-rights lawyering in the
years before Brown. First, however, one crucial issue must be addressed: Whether Dickerson’s
legal practice supports the claim that he was a leading African-American civil-rights lawyer. A
leading African-American lawyer, without doubt. But a leading civil-rights lawyer?
At first blush, the objection has force. Most of Dickerson’s legal work for Supreme
Liberty was routine and mundane; he spent hours in the meetings at which the Supreme
Liberty’s executive committee would decide, application by individual application, whether to
approve mortgage requests.73 The same might be said of his other legal work. In the 1920s and
1930s, Dickerson’s lawyering for Supreme Liberty, the City and State, and private clients ran the
gamut of civil work, with an occasional criminal matter thrown in. Judging by the reported
decisions, he was a good lawyer, losing a few more cases than he won.74 Aside from Hansberry,
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Dickerson, supra note 15, at 168. For instance, the minutes of the meetings at which
mortgages at issue in Hansberry showed Dickerson in attendance. The minutes reflected that
numerous potential mortgages were discussed, and voted on, by Supreme Liberty’s executive
board at these weekly meetings. See Defendants’ Exhibits 8 & 9, Lee v. Hansberry, No. 37 C
6804 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct.) (copies on file with author); Testimony of Harry Herbert Pace at 96100, id. (Copy on file with author).
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A Westlaw search for “earl /2 dickerson” in the IL-CS-ALL file revealed a total of fortynine citations, a few of which referred to another Earl Dickerson. Aside from Hansberry v. Lee
and the other cases already mentioned, Dickerson was listed as counsel or co-counsel in thirtyfour decisions in the Illinois Supreme Court or the Illinois appellate courts. Nearly all arose in
his capacity as a government lawyer; a couple were matters from private practice, and a few
involved Supreme Liberty. Counting only results of decisions, twelve were wins, twenty-one
were losses, and one was a tie (a vacated judgment). But that record is somewhat deceptive.
Some of the losses arose from multiple decisions in the same or related cases; some were on
preliminary procedural or juridictional points; and his work for the City of Chicago, which
principally involved fact-laden slip-and-falls in which the City had already lost at trial, padded
the loss column significantly. Aside from Hansberry and his other cases in the Supreme Court,
little in the reported decisions is noteworthy. The cases ranged from a couple of criminal matters
to real estate to licensing or disbarment proceedings to tax matters. Perhaps the most interesting
cases involved Dickerson’s representation of the Chicago Defender, the venerable African-18-

none of the reported cases in which he appeared would today be regarded as a “civil rights” case.
Indeed, even his best-known civil-rights case, Hansberry, was a push. Despite his efforts to use
the case as the vehicle to invalidate racially restrictive covenants, Dickerson won the case on a
procedural ground that turned out to be far more important to the law of class actions than to the
civil-rights movement.75 The ultimate victory on the issue of racially restrictive covenants went
to Thurgood Marshall in Shelley v. Kraemer,76 in which Dickerson’s only role was to file an
amicus brief.77
Moreover, even in Hansberry, Dickerson’s civil-rights credentials might be questioned.
Stradford, not Dickerson, represented Carl and Nannie Hansberry, the home buyers whose

American newspaper, against libel charges, and his defense of the deacon of a Baptist deacon
who was alleged to be taking steps to oust the pastor. Cobbs v. Chicago Defender, 31 N.E.2d
323 (Ill. 1941); Coleman v. Swanson, 11 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. App. 1937). The Defender and the
churches were, of course, pillars of the African-American community.
One question is whether Dickerson might have been a better lawyer than his record — in
other words, whether the color of his skin mattered to a white judiciary. It is impossible to know
the answer, but most of the cases in which he was involved were not racially charged. Nor was
Chicago known for any open hostility to its African-American bar. See Plotkin, supra note 37,
at 158-60. My review of the trial transcripts in Hansberry reveal some overt racism by one
judge who heard a preliminary motion, see Tidmarsh, supra note 19, at 244, but none by the trial
judge, who was from downstate Illinois.
75

On the significance of Hansberry to the law of class actions, see Tidmarsh, supra note
19, at 268-77; Kamp, supra note 37; Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class
Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287 (2003).
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334 U.S. 1 (1948). Although his legal argument is often criticized as risky and
dangerous, the eloquence at oral argument of another African-American lawyer in Shelley,
George Vaughn, is sometimes credited with helping to sway the Supreme Court. See William B.
Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes among Group Members and Lawyers in
Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1630 (1997).
77

See supra note 67.
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purchase tested the covenants’ validity.78 Dickerson appeared on behalf of Supreme Liberty and
its president, Harry Herbert Pace. Supreme Liberty held the mortgage to the Hansberrys’ house
and had reasonable prospects of holding many more if the covenants could be abolished. Thus,
it might be said, he was protecting his clients’ financial interests as much as he was vindicating a
principle of racial equality.
Nor can Dickerson’s legal work in Hansberry be called inspired. It was adequate. His
pleadings were not as insightful as Mollison’s, and his examinations were not as sharp as
Stradford’s.79 He misjudged the strength of the due process argument that the United States
Supreme Court ultimately accepted, placing it well down the list of arguments in his “shotgun”
briefs in the Illinois courts.80 Unfortunately, no transcripts of his arguments in the Illinois
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court survive, but the transcript of the trial reveals
the same passionate bulldozer who refused to sugarcoat things on the City Council and FEPC,
and who nettled easily at the thinly veiled racism of opposing counsel.
It is true that the civil-rights credential which Dickerson most lacked was a single78

Tidmarsh, supra note 19, at 241; Plotkin, supra note 37, at 154. A significant portion of
the litigation expenses in Hansberry were defrayed by the Hansberry Foundation, which Carl
Hansberry had established in 1936 with an initial endowment of $10,000 and with a mission to
“enforce legal action in cases of racial discrimination.” Plotkin, supra note 37, at 142. Much of
the remainder came from Supreme Liberty, although some also came from donation. See Iron
Ring in Housing, 47 THE CRISIS 205 (July 1940).
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My review of all the pleadings and trial transcripts in Hansberry suggest that Mollison’s
final pleading best developed the arguments that would be successful in Hansberry, Shelley, and
even Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See Amended Answer of Israel Katz,
Lee v. Hansberry, No. 37 C 6804 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct.), reprinted in Abstract of Record at 56-64,
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (No. 29); Amended Rejoinder of Israel Katz, Lee v.
Hansberry, No. 37 C 6804 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct.), reprinted in Abstract of Record at 65-71,
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (No. 29)
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See Brief and Argument for Appellants at 75-88, Lee v. Hansberry, 24 N.E.2d 37 (Ill.
1939) (No. 25116).
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minded commitment to litigation as the vehicle for changing the racial dynamic in interwar
America. As Mack’s thesis argues, however, such a commitment was not typical of AfricanAmerican civil-rights lawyers during this period, and should not be regarded as an essential
attribute of civil-rights lawyering in the years between the World Wars. Instead, Mack claims,
the principal strategy of African-American lawyers after World War I was race uplift. Part of
the uplift strategy was “legalism” (the assertion of legal claims to obtain rights of equal
citizenship), but a much larger part was “voluntarism” (the bolstering of African-American
businesses and civic groups).81 These two strands merged into a “cultural-institutional
pluralism” in which African-American lawyers both built up segregated African-American
institutions and worked to desegregate majority institutions. These seemingly inconsistent goals
in fact had a common aim: In proving the worth and ability of African-American to run their
own businesses and professions, lawyers could disprove the argument that African-Americans
were unsuited to participate in majority institutions.82 Thus, segregation would crumble.
By the 1930s, Mack contends, the dominance of the voluntarist component of this
strategy was threatened to a degree by a new strategy of public agitation to combat
discrimination. But this new agitation was not yet the Brown strategy. It did not focus on public
institutions like schools, but rather on discrimination in the private workplace; and it did not use
the lawsuit as its tool, but rather collective actions such as boycotts and protests.83 Not until
1938, which Mack identifies as a watershed year in the direction of African-American civilrights lawyering, did the idea of using litigation to end discrimination in the private labor market
81

Mack, supra note 2, at 280-81.
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Id. at 277-79.
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Id. at 308.
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achieve a strategic footing equivalent to voluntarism and collective action; at the same time, the
idea of using litigation to end discrimination in public institutions gained at least a tenuous
foothold.84 The first mile of the long road to Brown had finally been paved, even though it was
not yet the clear intent of the civil-rights bar to travel in Brown’s direction.
On the surface, Dickerson’s career fits Mack’s thesis hand-in-glove. Dickerson’s
principal work as a young lawyer in the 1920s was helping to establish, expand, and keep
Supreme Liberty afloat — seemingly a classic voluntarist undertaking. Although real estate
remained a principal focus, Dickerson too was shifting his attention toward employment
discrimination by the end of the 1930s; his work in the early 1940s as an alderman to end
discrimination among bus drivers, as president of the Chicago Urban League to mobilize a
nationwide protest against discriminatory employment practices among defense contractors,85
and as a member of FEPC to end discrimination among these contractors suggests that his own
understanding of the significance of equal rights in employment was growing alongside that of
other civil-rights lawyers. Furthermore, Dickerson viewed political and economic advancement,
not litigation, as the principal tool to improve the lives of African-Americans.86 His switch to
the Democratic Party resulted from his frustration with the way in which Republicans took the
black vote for granted, and his desire to spur both parties to compete for the vote by delivering
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Dickerson, supra note 15, at 54. Dickerson had already begun to agitate for fair
employment opportunities in 1937, when he became vice president of the Urban League. Id.
Dickerson points out that Dickerson’s call for a national protest antedated the similar call by A.
Philip Randolph by more than two months. Randolph’s call for a national march is usually
credited as the precipitating cause of Roosevelt’s executive order establishing FEPC. Granger,
supra note 56, at 414-15.
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the legislative goods.87 Even as he was battling Hansberry in the courts, he was chairing the
South Side Legislative Committee, which aimed to end racial covenants and other private
discriminatory practices through legislation.88
By the end of the 1930s, litigation was emerging in Dickerson’s mind as an option. He
had a role in establishing the Legal Defense Fund.89 And of course there was Hansberry, which,
in comparison to restrictive-covenant cases litigated earlier in the 1930s, was defended with a
ferocity that evidences an increased willingness to use courts to recognize a legal claim for nondiscriminatory treatment in the private housing market.90 This too is consistent with Mack’s
thesis; although Hansberry had commenced in 1937, a year before Mack’s watershed, it was
principally litigated from 1938 to 1940. Moreover, in Hansberry, Dickerson included testimony
from an economist, a demographer, and a realtor in order to prove both the dire overcrowding
among Chicago’s African-Americans and the lack of harm to property values from AfricanAmerican neighbors91 — a decidedly realist approach that squares with Mack’s assertion about
87
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Four prior cases had in one fashion or another raised the validity of the covenants. In the
first three, the African-American tenants never retained their own counsel to fight the suits —
even though the tenant in one of the cases, Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934), was
James Lowell Hall, a doctor who one of the leading figures in the African-American community.
Indeed, the weakness of the defense in Burke created the inadequacy-of-representation issue that
Dickerson rode to victory in Hansberry. The fourth case, Plath v. DeLaunty, 7 N.E.2d 637 (Ill.
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Hansberry, and his lawyer was C. Francis Stradford. Hansberry was willing to fight the issue,
but the court decided the case against him on another ground. See Tidmarsh, supra note 19, at
225-32.
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Testimony of John P. Edelin, supra note 38; Testimony of Howard D. Gould, supra note
38; Testimony of Wallace R. Anthon, Lee v. Hansberry, No. 37 C 6804 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct.)
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legal realism’s influence on African-American civil-rights lawyers in this era.92
Despite these points of convergence, however, Dickerson’s interwar career exposes some gaps in
Mack’s thesis. To an extent, these gaps result from Dickerson’s atypicality — he was the only
African-American lawyer of his day to be a legislator, a member of a presidential committee,
and a litigator in the Supreme Court. But Dickerson’s very prominence in the African-American
bar requires that a thesis about civil-rights lawyering conform to the evidence of Dickerson’s
life.
The first gap concerns the nature and origin of voluntarism. Mack traces the origins of
voluntarism as a cohesive legal strategy to African-American lawyers who practiced law before
World War I. In Mack’s account, the idea of voluntarism was well understood by 1920; at
various points, he refers to it as a “strategy”93 or a “mission,”94 implying that a blueprint for the
professional work of African-American civil-rights lawyers existed and needed only to be
followed by individual members of the bar. But the evidence for such a top-down plan is thin at
least for the first decade after World War I. Mack draws some of his evidence about the
voluntarist strategy from speeches given at the National Bar Association, which could have
served as a central strategic clearinghouse; but the NBA was not founded until 1925, and many
of the speeches Mack cites come from the late 1920s or early 1930s.95 Houston, on whose work

(copy on file with author); Testimony of Fenton W. Harsh, Jr., Lee v. Hansberry, No. 37 C 6804
(Cook Cty. Cir. Ct.) (copy on file with author).
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Mack also draws, did not graduate from Harvard Law School until 1922; his well-known tract on
the state of the African-American bar was not published until 1928; and his implementation of a
business-oriented curriculum at Howard Law School, on which Mack relies to help prove the
emergence of a voluntarist strategy, occurred in the early 1930s.96 Mack does not point to any
African-American lawyer of the stature of a Houston or a Dickerson nationally orchestrating a
voluntarist strategy in the early 1920s. Indeed, not until 1930 is the evidence strong enough to
suggest that voluntarism had developed into a nationally discussed, top-down strategy for the
civil-rights bar, and by then voluntarism was, as Mack describes, already on the wane.97
Dickerson’s early career highlights the difficulty of connecting African-American
lawyering in the early 1920s to a voluntarist strategy. Dickerson was the first African-American
to graduate from the University of Chicago Law School, so he had no internal law-school
network from which to learn about a voluntarist strategy or how to implement it. Nor were there
any external networks into which he appears to have tapped. Dickerson was a member of Kappa
Alpha Psi, the first fraternity of African-American college graduates whose alumni chapter he
helped found in 1923,98 but there is no suggestion that this fraternity served as a vehicle for
disseminating civil-rights lawyering strategies. Dickerson would not necessarily have come into
contact with any voluntarist strategy in his legal practice; he worked for the City of Chicago in
an integrated law office, and in solo practice. Although Dickerson briefly formed a partnership
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with Edward Morris, then the dean of Chicago’s black lawyers, in the mid-1920s, he and Morris
were never close, nor is there any indication that Morris was the conduit for a strategy
percolating within the entire African-American bar.99 Dickerson’s signal achievement to
advance race uplift — the one which Mack cites100 — was the incorporation of Liberty Life. But
that occurred in 1920, and was the result of happenstance and available opportunity (recall that
Dickerson had first sought employment in white firms before falling in with Liberty Life) rather
than design.
Given his prominence, Dickerson might have been expected to assist in the development
and implementation of a voluntarist strategy, but nothing in his biography or his surviving papers
indicates that he did so in the early 1920s.101 Drake and Cayton’s famous sociological study of
Chicago, Black Metropolis, lays the voluntarist approach at the feet of African-American clergy
and business leaders, not lawyers.102 Dickerson makes no mention of Dickerson’s knowledge of
a race-uplift strategy during the early years of his career, a fact which may not be surprising
given the mixed meanings and non-strategic uses of the term for African Americans.103 At most,
99

Morris invited Dickerson into a partnership when Dickerson cleverly bested him in a
probate matter. Dickerson, supra note 15, at 45-46. Morris receives no mention in Mack’s
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Dickerson suggests that Dickerson grew over time toward a complex view of race uplift — but
one that he believed he was implementing principally as a businessman rather than as a
lawyer.104 One inference that can be drawn from the match-up between Dickerson’s early career
and Mack’s thesis is that the dissemination of a voluntarist strategy to rising African-American
lawyers like Dickerson must have occurred, and these lawyers must have consciously followed
the plan. But another inference is equally possible — that African-American lawyers like
Dickerson were bound by their practical realities and took the work that came in the door. That
some of this work involved institution-building in the African-American communities is
unsurprising: After all, who else would employ African-American lawyers and be able to pay
their fees? On this view, voluntarism is useful only as a post-hoc description of what AfricanAmerican lawyers like Dickerson did in a world with most legal opportunities closed to them. It
was not initially an ideal that motivated their actions, and thus was not a part of a grand strategy
of race uplift.
One way to choose between these contrasting views — voluntarism as a bold strategy of
racial improvement or voluntarism as a sad reflection of racial suppression — is to bring civilrights lawyering into contact with larger intellectual and political currents in African-American
life during the early twentieth century. Put differently, even if there is no specific evidence that
lawyers were acting according to a strategy of voluntarism crafted by the African-American bar,
evidence that institution building was a priority among the African-American professional and
dating from “the antislavery folk religion of the slaves, speaks of a personal or collective
spiritual — and potentially — transcendence for worldly oppression and misery.” Id. at 1.
Gaines notes another connotation of uplift among black elites came to mean “an emphasis on
self-help, racial solidarity, temperance, thrift, chastity, social purity, patriarchal authority, and
the accumulation of wealth.” Id. at 2.
104
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intellectual elite in the United States might lead to an inference that lawyers, undoubtedly
attuned to such trends, understood their supporting roles.
Mack suggests that voluntarism’s strongest proponent was Booker T. Washington.105 But
Washington seems an unlikely wellspring for a civil-rights lawyering strategy after World War
I.106 To begin with, Washington’s influence within the African-American community had fallen
significantly by the time of his death in 1915.107 Moreover, Washington’s view of race relations,
forged from Southern agrarian conditions, was too modest to support the type of institution
building in which Northern African-American lawyers were supposedly engaging.108 In his
famous Atlanta Compromise speech, Washington, the Great Accommodator, argued that, for the
time being, African-Americans needed to forego political power, civil rights, and higher
education in business and the liberal arts; in return, they should be allowed to make gradual
progress in business and agriculture, prove their merit through diligence and moral character,
gain economic power, and eventually earn equal rights.109 He was one of the forces behind the
Urban League, which perpetuated the Bookerite philosophy of sacrificing political rights for a
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limited measure of economic stability.110 Some features that Mack ascribes to voluntarism,
especially the anti-legalist acceptance of segregation and the focus on building economic power,
find reflection in Washington’s words. But Washington was not an advocate of a separate
African-American society, complete with its own professional elite, universities, banks, life
insurance companies, and the like.
In other ways, voluntarism seems more closely associated with the populist Marcus
Garvey and the sociologist W.E.B. DuBois. Garvey flashed briefly but brilliantly in the 1920s
with his call for racial separatism, his pan-Africanism, and his efforts to establish several
African-American companies. But his influence in America, especially among better educated
African-Americans, was neither strong nor enduring;111 nor do the dates of his influence match
up well with supposed rise of a voluntarist strategy. DuBois, the more significant figure,
competed with Washington for supremacy over the direction of the African-American future in
the early part of the twentieth century. The traditional story of the opposition between
Washington and DuBois focuses on Washington’s call for accommodation as opposed to
DuBois’s call for a more militant activism against racial injustice. DuBois was a leading force
behind the creation of an integrated NAACP, the Urban League’s rival which agitated more
directly for integration and against discrimination. He focused more on political than economic
rights, and he argued for a classic liberal college education— an education that Washington
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For instance, Harry Herbert Pace, who became president of Supreme Liberty in 1929 and
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demeaned in favor of industrial and technical arts — for the “talented tenth” of AfricanAmericans who would serve as the leaders of African-American communities.112 He and
Washington cooperated on the formation of the National Negro Business League, with DuBois
supplying the data and Washington the organizing impetus; but DuBois was too suspicious of
commercialism’s potential to dominate intellectual achievement for him to be regarded as a
founder of voluntarism.113 Nonetheless, voluntarism seems to have important links to DuBois,
who refused to accept that the fate of African-Americans was to work in menial jobs, and who
apprehended more clearly the direction of African-American life in the industrialized North.114
DuBois’s writing often glorified African-Americans’ separate racial identity and their destiny.115
By 1934, DuBois turned decidedly away from integration and toward the creation of a separate
African-American economy and infrastructure — but that turn was far too late to label him as
the root of voluntarism.116
The lack of a tight connection between Mack’s voluntarism and the strategies of either
Washington or DuBois hurts the claim that voluntarism was part of a larger civil-rights strategy.
On this point, Dickerson’s career also undercuts the claim. Dickerson was a paradox, with feet
in both camps. On the one hand, he had worked for Washington for one academic year, from
1913 to 1914. On the other hand, while on the NAACP’s Board in the late 1940s, Dickerson
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worked to bring DuBois back to the NAACP.117 Dickerson became a member of the Chicago
branch of the Washington-inspired Urban League in the early 1920s and served as its president
between 1939 and 1955.118 But Dickerson also joined the Chicago branch of the DuBoisinspired NAACP in the 1920s, became an officer of the branch in the 1930s, and became a
member of its national Board of Directors in the 1940s.119 The interviews with Dickerson that
form the backbone of Blakely’s biography suggest that Dickerson respected Washington.120 In
those same interviews, Dickerson expressed a lifelong admiration for DuBois.121 Dickerson’s
work at Supreme Liberty to create economic opportunities for African-Americans echoes
Washington, but his lifelong love of liberal education, his early efforts to have AfricanAmericans exercise their right to vote, his blunt intolerance of discrimination, his efforts to cross
color lines, and his aristocratic, “Talented Tenth” view of leadership suggest the influence of
DuBois. DuBois also exercised an important if indirect influence on Dickerson. The president
of Supreme Liberty after the 1929 merger — in other words, Dickerson’s boss — was Harry
Herbert Pace, who had been a pupil, business partner, and academic colleague of DuBois.122 In
the end, if we were to tote up the intellectual contributions to Dickerson’s world view, DuBois
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would have the edge over Washington; and to the extent that these contributions influenced
Dickerson’s professional choices and career, DuBois was the greater influence.
If Mack is correct that voluntarism is a strategy most associated with Washington, there
is reason to doubt that Dickerson saw himself as an implement of that strategy — and, given
Dickerson’s prominence, there is also some reason to doubt that voluntarism was a strategy
affirmatively adopted and pursued by other civil-rights lawyers in the 1920s. Voluntarism might
describe to an extent what Dickerson was doing, but it is not likely that it is what he wanted to be
doing. That fact exposes the second difficulty in Mack’s thesis. Because he helped build up the
most successful African-American enterprise established between the World Wars, Dickerson
seems to be the classic voluntarist. In his heart, however, he was anything but that. He was an
integrationist — not in twenty or thirty years after a strong separate African-American
community had been established, but now. Near the end of his life, he summarized his life’s
work as follows: “For over fifty years I have been dedicated to the ultimate attainment of an
integrated society as the means to solving this country’s racial dilemma.”123
Although it is always important to take care to distinguish retrospective rose-colored
reflections from the evidence of the actual events in a person’s life, the evidence bolsters his
claim. He attended Northwestern University, the University of Illinois, and the University of
Chicago, rather than historically black institutions. As a government lawyer, he worked in
integrated legal practices in the 1920s and 1930s. He sought to break down color lines
throughout his professional and personal life. He nearly refused his commission in World War I
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because of the lack of integrated fighting forces. He tried, unsuccessfully, to cross the color line
among prominent Chicago law firms when he graduated. In 1945 he was in the first group of
African-American lawyers to gain admission to the Chicago Bar Association, and he worked
behind the scenes to secure admission of the first African-American to the Illinois Bar
Association.124 He helped to found the National Lawyers Guild, and when he became its
president in 1951, he became the first African-American to lead an integrated national bar
organization. In 1947, a year before Shelley v. Kraemer, Dickerson became the first AfricanAmerican to live in Hyde Park, which was also bound by racially restrictive covenants. He was
willing to become another Carl Hansberry; but his neighbors, rather than fighting, chose to
accept him.125 He also sued Chicago’s prestigious Palmer House for its failure to serve him; and
he became the first African-American to eat in its restaurant (paying his bill with the proceeds of
the judgment).126 Likewise, he became the first African-American to stay at the Waldorf Astoria
in New York127 and the Mayflower in Washington, D.C.128 In the 1950s he became the first
African-American to sit on the board of a white-owned bank in Chicago.129
Even his career as general counsel for Supreme Liberty is less clearly voluntarist than it
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might initially appear. Critical to Supreme Liberty’s health was its mortgage business.130 But
mortgage lending wasn’t just a business. In many northern cities in the 1920s and 1930s, the
principal African-American concern was not school segregation; far more significant were
employment discrimination and impossibly overcrowded housing conditions, which had resulted
in large measure from restrictive covenants.131 Home ownership had a particular significance for
African-Americans; Congress had recognized the right to own property as a civil right almost
seventy-five years before Brown.132 So Supreme Liberty’s mortgage business mixed profit and
civil rights in equal and indistinguishable measures.133 In particular, “invading” white
neighborhoods to break down racial covenants made good business sense, but it also had a
radical edge. Dickerson had been trying to undermine restrictive covenants almost from their
inception in the 1920s.134 In a newspaper article in 1938, Dickerson linked racially restrictive
covenants with “jim crowism, segregation, police terror, and persecution against the Negro
people.”135 Work to end the covenants was work to end deplorable living conditions, as well as
work to end racism. Obliquely referring to Dickerson, one observer remarked:
The specific invasion techniques . . ., like sponsorship of white purchasers and formation
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of various trusteeships, are associated with a Negro life insurance company in all except
one instance. The invasion “know-how” may thus be said to have been developed to its
greatest level of efficiency by legal counsel for the Negro life insurance company.136
Dickerson was not naive. He knew that the likely short-term consequence of busting
racial covenants was white flight rather than integration.137 But the long-term ideal of an
integrated society was not possible as long as the covenants remained in force. So was his work
at Supreme Liberty an attempt, in a voluntarist way, to build up an African-American business,
or was it an attempt to achieve an integrated society? Dickerson’s linkage of restrictive
covenants with other forms of segregation suggests that voluntarism was never Dickerson’s
preferred strategy. But neither was making legalist claims for equality that were enforceable
through litigation. So if neither the “legal liberal,” the revisionist, nor Mack’s thesis can explain
Dickerson’s philosophy of civil-rights lawyering, what might?

III

The first key in unlocking Dickerson’s motivation is his professionalism. He was, first
and foremost, a lawyer. The legal liberal and revisionist accounts, as well as Mack’s theory,
accept the account of civil-rights lawyers as “social engineers” trying to craft strategies to
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overcome racism in America. The difference between Mack’s account and the others is only
about what interwar civil-rights lawyers were trying to engineer — the overthrow of Plessy and
other forms of segregation in public institutions (the legal liberal and revisionist account) or the
building of separate African-American institutions whose success would eventually undermine
segregation (Mack’s voluntarist account). In both accounts, the lawyers sat at the pinnacle of the
African-American social order; they controlled the direction of civil-rights reform. Dickerson’s
career suggests that African-American lawyers didn’t necessarily set the agenda. They were
professionals trying to earn the respect of the bar.138 In their day, that meant that their principal
loyalty was to their clients’ interests, not to larger causes.
Seeing Dickerson first as a professional and second as a civil-rights strategist explains
Dickerson’s eclectic legal practice, which included far fewer civil-rights cases than routine tax
and financial cases, and less litigation than transactional work. Dickerson’s sense of
professional responsibility also explains his tactical decisions in Hansberry. Dickerson wanted
to hit a home run — to have the court declare racially restrictive covenants either
unconstitutional or void as against public policy. But the particular covenant involved in the
Hansberrys’ neighborhood had a sui generis flaw — it had arguably not been signed by enough
residents to be enforceable — that would render the covenant in Hansberry invalid but leave
covenants elsewhere still standing. As a good lawyer should (but not necessarily as a good cause
lawyer would), Dickerson made both arguments. The latter argument led him to the then-
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uncharted intersection of the law of class actions and the due process clause, which was the
ground on which the Supreme Court rendered its decision. Dickerson’s lawyerly approach also
explains his ethically dodgy willingness to trumpet the trial court’s erroneous factual finding
about the covenant’s unenforceability in his Supreme Court brief, when he knew that finding to
be untrue but when he also knew that the finding might help him to win the case on the dueprocess ground that made his goal of invalidating all racial covenants unattainable.139 As a
lawyer, Dickerson became the father of the modern class action; but as a civil-rights litigator, he
struck out.
If Dickerson’s career is representative of others at the bar, civil rights seeped into the
interstices of ordinary legal work; they were not a mainstay. The principal focus of the AfricanAmerican bar was to lift itself up — to create a bar that was the equal of the white bar. One of
the striking features of the Hansberry dream team is that they were a new generation of AfricanAmerican lawyers, all of whom had graduated from predominantly white law schools —
Dickerson, Mollison, Moore, and Gibson from the University of Chicago, and Stradford from
Columbia.140 Dickerson’s status as the “dean of Chicago’s black lawyers” seemed to derive
more from his peers’ recognition of the quality of his work in the courtroom and the law office
than from the civil-rights positions he staked out. By the middle to late 1920s, as their practices
became established and they created organizations like the National Bar Association, AfricanAmerican lawyers could start to turn their attention to larger questions of civil rights. But, to the
extent that Dickerson’s early career provides the evidence, it is a mistake to see the AfricanAmerican bar during these years as the engineers of a general strategy of race uplift. Dickerson
139

See Tidmarsh, supra note 19, at 243-56.

140

See Plotkin, supra note 37, at 154-58.
-37-

was as fortunate as anyone to be in a position both to do well and to do good. Nonetheless, he
was less a social engineer than a dutiful draftsman.
This fact is especially true after 1929, when Harry Herbert Pace became president of
Supreme Liberty. A consummate entrepreneur, Pace was a gigantic figure in the AfricanAmerican community, much larger than Dickerson was at the time. (It is an unfortunate
weakness of the biography that Dickerson fails to explore the relationship between these two
iconic figures; Pace rates only passing mentions.141) Pace was a “race man”; he had made a
career of establishing African-American businesses to serve the African-American
community.142 If anyone embodied the voluntarist spirit, it was Pace, not Dickerson. To the
extent that Dickerson’s work at Supreme Liberty supplies evidence for the existence of a
voluntarist strategy, it is important to distinguish between Dickerson’s personal views and those
of the client he represented.
That distinction holds the key to the second half of understanding Dickerson’s
motivation. If my view of Dickerson is correct, one of the puzzles in his professional life is how
a man of Dickerson’s notorious impatience could have worked so long for Pace,143 whose racial
agenda seemed to diverge from Dickerson’s. The answer is that, in an important sense,
Dickerson was not precisely an integrationist. Dickerson believed that every person should be
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able to choose where to work and live — hence his passion to demolish discriminatory barriers
in both public and private life. In a world without barriers, some people would choose an
integrated environment. But Dickerson understood that other people would choose a segregated
environment.144 Dickerson’s personal preference, which was often stymied for the first fifty
years of his life, was to live and work in an integrated environment. At the same time, he
cherished a separate and vibrant black culture, which he worried that integration might
destroy.145 What he ultimately saw himself vindicating by his actions was not a right of equality,
but a right of autonomy — a right to live the life a person chose, free of social constructs that
irrationally constrained opportunity. As one of Dickerson’s contemporaries summed him up:
There was a certain autonomy of spirit about Mr. Dickerson. He could not have been
both a successful businessman and an effective radical without a great self-confidence,
without this freedom of spirit, without that awareness that in a certain sense complete
freedom comes from within. He had that quality to an unusual degree.146
As Dickerson said near the end of his life: “Nobody can encroach on my dignity. I will not
tolerate it.”147
In this philosophy lies the reconciliation of Earl Dickerson’s paradoxical tendencies —
respecting Washington while admiring DuBois, a leader of the Urban League and the NAACP, a
litigator and a legislator, a lawyer and a businessman. For those, like Pace, who chose the way
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of separatism, who wished to build up a culturally and institutionally plural society, Dickerson
was willing to lend his talents and energy. For those who wished to break down color lines in
housing, employment, professional associations, and schools, Dickerson was willing to be their
voice. He wished to be free to live his life as he wanted, and he wished the same freedom for
others.

IV

Dickerson tells the story of one of the forgotten lions of the pre-Brown civil-rights era. It
has a particular focus on the man, rather than on the movement. The final judgment on
Dickerson the man is bittersweet. He was great in his time, but he wanted to be, and could have
been, greater. His victory in Hansberry made him the father of the modern class action, the
device on which so much civil-rights lawyering has depended;148 yet he enjoyed no triumphal
achievement that keeps his name on the tongues of the present generation of civil-rights lawyers.
His impatient intolerance of injustice gave him a prophetic quality, but also led him down the
path of political suicide.
Viewed through the different lens of the civil-rights movement, Dickerson lends support
to Mack’s central claim — that in the years before World War II, African-American civil-rights
lawyers had not yet adopted a litigation strategy aimed at ending segregation in public
institutions. As Dickerson’s career shows, the goals of the African-American bar were diffuse,
and the means African-American civil-rights lawyers used to accomplish those goals had not yet
148
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concentrated on the courtroom. At the same time, Dickerson calls for refinements of Mack’s
treatment. Mack suggests that the African-American civil-rights bar initially adopted a twoprong strategy of voluntarist separation and legalist claims for integration, and that the key to
reconciling these seemingly contrary impulses lies in the idea of cultural-institutional pluralism.
Dickerson’s career during these years suggests that voluntarism was less an affirmative strategy
adopted by the civil-rights bar than an acknowledgment of the reality that African-American
lawyers wishing to ply their trade were hemmed in by the same majority institutions as their
clients. It also suggests the sources of the voluntarist strategy might lie more in the AfricanAmerican business community than in its legal community. Finally, Dickerson suggests that
Dickerson’s motivation did not arise from the complex idea of a cultural-institutional pluralist
group identity, but from the basic human intuition of autonomy — of the worth, the dignity, and
the right of every person to choose how and with whom to live.
Mack might still be correct in the main, and Dickerson might be an atypical
representative of the interwar African-American civil-rights bar. But Mack’s account does not
precisely capture the driving passion of one of the bar’s leading figures. The subtitle of
Dickerson’s biography — A Voice for Freedom and Equality — puts Dickerson’s beliefs in their
proper order.
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